American University International Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 3

Article 6

2010

Fighting Firearms with Fire in the OAS: A Critical
Evaluation of the Inter-American Convention
Against the Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, and Other Related
Materials
Kierstan Lee Carlson

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Trade Commons
Recommended Citation
Carlson, Kierstan Lee. “Fighting Firearms with Fire in the OAS: A Critical Evaluation of the Inter-American Convention Against the
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, and Other Related Materials.” American University International Law
Review 25, no.3 (2010): 611-648.

This Comment or Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

CARLSON AUTHOR CHECK 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

6/3/2010 6:16 PM

COMMENT
FIGHTING FIREARMS WITH FIRE IN THE
OAS: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST
THE MANUFACTURING OF AND
TRAFFICKING IN FIREARMS, AMMUNITION,
AND OTHER RELATED MATERIALS
KIERSTAN LEE CARLSON*
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 613
I. BACKGROUND.......................................................................... 616
A. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS REGULATING SALW
TRAFFICKING ........................................................................ 616
1. Overview of CIFTA: Development, Requirements,
and Successes ................................................................ 618
2. Tackling SALW at the Global Level: The U.N.
Protocol and Programme of Action ............................... 622
B. EXAMPLES OF CIFTA VIOLATIONS: PAST AND (POSSIBLY)
PRESENT ............................................................................... 624
1. Confirmed Violation: Diversion of Nicaraguan AK47s.................................................................................. 624
2. Probable Violation: Diversion of Venezuelan Antitank Rocket Launchers .................................................. 625
II. ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 626

* J.D. Candidate, American University, Washington College of Law, May 2011;
A.B. Political Science, Brown University, 2005. Special thanks to Professors
David Spratt and John Heywood for their assistance with this Comment, to Conor
Garry for his patience, to my parents for their continual support, and to Matthew
Carney, and the editors and staff of the International Law Review for their hard
work on this piece and all the pieces we publish.

611

CARLSON_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

612

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/3/2010 6:16 PM

[25:611

A. REVIEWING THE REASONS BEHIND CIFTA’S
INEFFECTIVENESS ................................................................. 626
1. CIFTA’s Failure to Provide Effective Mechanisms to
Monitor and Enforce Compliance Hinders its
Efficacy .......................................................................... 627
a. Effective Treaties Require Effective Mechanisms .... 627
b. The Impact of CIFTA’s Lack of Compliance
Mechanisms ............................................................. 630
2. Minor Textual Inadequacies with Major Consequences . 633
a. CIFTA’s Failure to Require Destruction of
Confiscated Weapons and Proper Management of
Surplus Stockpiles Leaves Many SALW
Susceptible to Diversion .......................................... 634
b. CIFTA Fails to Clearly Identify What Information
Licenses for SALW Transfers Must Contain and
to Mandate End-User Requirements........................ 637
c. CIFTA’s Failure to Include Unmarked or
Inadequately Marked SALW in its Definition of
“Illicit Trafficking” Prevents Effective Detection
and Prevention of Unlawful SALW Trafficking ..... 640
III. RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................... 642
A. MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING AND ENFORCING
COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE CREATED TO FACILITATE
STATES’ IMPLEMENTATION OF CIFTA ................................. 642
B. CIFTA SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR
DESTRUCTION OF CONFISCATED AND FORFEITED
WEAPONS, PROPER STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT, DETAILED
LICENSING, AND MANDATORY END-USE REQUIREMENTS
FOR ALL SALW, AND AN EXPANDED DEFINITION OF
ILLICIT TRAFFICKING............................................................ 644
1. Required Destruction of Confiscated and Forfeited
Weapons and Effective Stockpile Management Will
Reduce the Risk of Illicit SALW Trafficking in
CIFTA States ................................................................. 645
2. The Addition of Licensing and End-User
Requirements into CIFTA’s Text Will Assist Law
Enforcement in Combating Trafficking and Clarify
States’ Responsibilities .................................................. 646

CARLSON AUTHOR CHECK 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

FIGHTING FIREARMS WITH FIRE IN THE OAS

6/3/2010 6:16 PM

613

3. Including Marking Requirements in CIFTA’s
Definition of “Illicit Trafficking” Will Expand
CIFTA’s Reach and Promote Law Enforcement
Efforts to Track Illegal SALW ...................................... 647
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 647

INTRODUCTION
Illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (“SALW”)
undermines the stability of governments and the security of
communities around the globe.1 SALW are particularly dangerous
because they are extremely lethal, yet portable and easy to use.2
Despite the tangible threats presented by SALW, however, the global
arms industry continues to manufacture these weapons at an
alarming rate.3 SALW are readily available on the legal market
through legitimate sales as well as on the black and gray markets
through illegal diversions.4 Consequently, SALW are valued tools of
the trade for violent criminals, both domestic and transnational.
1. See DAMIEN ROGERS, POSTINTERNATIONALISM AND SMALL ARMS
CONTROL: THEORY, POLITICS, SECURITY 51 (Ashgate 2009) (1975) (noting that the
impact of violence through the use of SALW is felt across national borders and has
a deleterious effect on human security worldwide). There is no universally
accepted definition of SALW, but there is a general consensus that “small arms”
refers to weapons such as machine guns which can be wielded by an individual,
whereas “light weapons” include larger, military-style weapons that usually require
a crew of people to operate. See also CHRISTINE JOJARTH, CRIME, WAR, AND
GLOBAL TRAFFICKING: DESIGNING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 223 (2009)
(discussing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s working
definition of SALW, which is widely accepted in the field of international policy).
2. See Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2333, 2335 (2003) (emphasizing that even children can carry and operate SALW
with “sickening ease”).
3. See KIM CRAGIN & BRUCE HOFFMAN, RAND NAT’L DEF. RES. INST., ARMS
TRAFFICKING AND COLOMBIA 52 (2003) (observing that in 2001, over 600
companies produced SALW—a three-fold increase since 1980).
4. See id. at xiii n.1 (explaining that SALW are available through three
different channels: 1) the licit market, where weapons are legally exchanged via
authorized actors; 2) the gray market, where one of the parties to the transaction is
legitimate, but the other is not; and 3) the black market, where transactions occur
between illegitimate parties). The most common diversions of SALW occur when
weapons are sold to non-state actors, such as paramilitary groups, and moved
across national borders without the authorization of all states involved. See
JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 224 (defining diversion as “the movement of a weapon
from legal origins to the illicit realm”).
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SALW trafficking has had a devastating effect on many regions,
particularly Latin America, which has seen dramatic increases in
crime and violence due to the illicit weapons trade.5 Though
democratic Latin American states have developed economically and
politically, threats to security have shifted from conflicts between
states to the activities of subversive, transnational criminal groups.6
Inadequate controls on military stockpiles and widespread
government corruption have further aggravated this tenuous situation
because both are linked to illicit SALW transfers.7 The combination
of Latin America’s political environment with a hazardous increase
in the availability of SALW is endangering individual safety,
hindering economic development, and depleting states’ confidence in
their governmental structures.8
Illicit SALW trafficking is not unregulated in Latin America.9
Thirty of the thirty-five member states of the Organization of
5. See Nidya Sarria, Small Arms in Latin America in the Aftermath of the
NACLA Study, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.coha.org/small-arms-in-latin-america-in-the-aftermath-of-the-naclastudy/ (discussing statistics showing that there are 45 to 80 million SALW in Latin
America, and observing that while most of these weapons were purchased legally,
many have been used for unlawful purposes like drug trafficking and homicides);
Rachel Stohl & Doug Tuttle, The Small Arms Trade in Latin America, NACLA
Report on the Americas, Mar. – Apr. 2008, at 16 (observing unexpected increases
in gun-related homicide in decades following cessation of civil warfare in Latin
American countries).
6. See generally Bruce Zagaris, Developments in the Institutional Architecture
and Framework of International Criminal Enforcement Cooperation in the
Western Hemisphere, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 421, 444-511 (2006)
(summarizing the development of Latin American responses to security issues and
recognizing that transnational criminals capitalize on economic development and
globalization by operating in multiple states simultaneously).
7. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 224 (stressing that mismanagement of
stockpiles and corrupt government officials are often the root cause of weapons
diversions); MATTHEW SCHROEDER, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, SMALL ARMS,
TERRORISM, AND THE OAS FIREARMS CONVENTION 4 (2004) (arguing that
“inadequately controlled caches of Cold War weaponry” are a “potentially
lucrative source of profit for unscrupulous arms brokers and a deadly threat to the
rest of us”).
8. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 35 (maintaining that illicit SALW trafficking
undermines the authority of sovereign governments); Sarria, supra note 5
(asserting that easy access to SALW increases the potential for localized, violent
conflicts throughout Latin America and stalls economic growth).
9. See infra Part I(A) (describing regional and global level SALW trafficking
instruments in effect in Latin America).
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American States (“OAS”) have ratified the Inter-American
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
(“CIFTA”).10 However, many of these states are falling short of full
compliance with CIFTA.11 This Comment evaluates CIFTA’s
efficacy in light of this non-compliance and through specific
comparison to global level United Nations (“U.N.”) agreements, and
argues that a dynamic and comprehensive response by the OAS and
state parties is necessary. Though CIFTA covers illicit
manufacturing and trafficking, this Comment will focus on the
agreement’s trafficking section only.12
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of CIFTA and the
two primary U.N. instruments regulating illicit SALW trafficking.13
This section also illustrates confirmed and probable CIFTA
violations.14 Part II offers a thorough analysis of CIFTA’s strengths
10. See generally Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, Nov. 14, 1997, [hereinafter
CIFTA] available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/e nglish/treaties/a-63.html
(controlling trade in firearms, ammunition, explosives and related materials,
requiring criminalization of illicit manufacturing and trafficking, and encouraging
cooperation between state parties). There are also binding and non-binding U.N.
agreements in place to which many Latin American states are parties. See infra
Part I(A)(2) (introducing the U.N. Protocol and Programme of Action).
11. See Conference of the States Party to the Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), Second Conference of the
States Party to CIFTA, Mexico City, Mex., Feb. 20-21, 2008, Summary of Country
Compliance With CIFTA: Status of Ratifications and National Firearms
Legislation in Force, 1, OEA/Ser.L/XXII.4.2 CIFTA/CEP-II/doc.5/08 (Feb. 8,
2008) [hereinafter Summary of Country Compliance] (noting incomplete
compliance with marking, export, and recordkeeping requirements by many
CIFTA parties).
12. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. II (vowing to combat both unlawful
manufacturing and trafficking in SALW).
13. See infra Part I(A) (delineating the requirements of CIFTA, the U.N.
Protocol, and the U.N. Programme of Action). The United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs is currently drafting the Arms Trade Treaty (“ATT”) aimed
at “strengthen[ing] non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control measures.”
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/html/ATT-OEWGStatements-1.shtml.
14. See infra Part I(B) (describing a diversion of Nicaraguan AK-47s that
contravened CIFTA and a potentially unlawful diversion of Venezuelan anti-tank
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and weaknesses, emphasizing flaws in the agreement’s
implementation and certain textual inadequacies.15 Part III
recommends that the OAS devise a compliance mechanism to
oversee CIFTA’s implementation and make specific textual
amendments as a means to compel states to fulfill their obligations
under the treaty.16

I. BACKGROUND
A. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS REGULATING SALW
TRAFFICKING
Many arms control agreements are rooted in the notion that states
have an inherent right of self-defense, and therefore also possess the
right to acquire weapons for themselves and to transfer them to other
states.17 States view weapons, particularly SALW, as beneficial to
their own security.18 At the same time, states also recognize that
criminals or rebel groups can use weapons like SALW to contravene
their authority and challenge their stability.19 Accordingly, states
enter into agreements regulating SALW to legally justify their own
possession and use of the weapons, while also limiting unauthorized
SALW transfers.20

guns).
15. See infra Part II (acknowledging positive progress resulting from CIFTA’s
implementation, but also criticizing the treaty’s lack of enforcement mechanisms
and imprecision).
16. See infra Part III (recommending that the OAS develop financially realistic
compliance mechanisms for CIFTA and proposing specific modifications to
CIFTA’s text).
17. See Theresa A. DiPerna, Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity “With
a View” Towards Extended State Responsibility, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 25, 33-34
(2008) (recognizing that states derive rights to individual and collective selfdefense from customary international law and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter).
18. Id. at 34.
19. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing the balancing that
governments must do in controlling small arms because the proliferation of illegal
small arms threatens the rule of law).
20. See Guido den Dekker, The Effectiveness of International Supervision in
Arms Control Law, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 315, 318-19 (2004) (proffering that
arms control agreements are a primary means for states to guarantee security
through the control of weapons).
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Agreements regulating illicit trafficking in SALW are generally
created and implemented through international organizations, such as
the U.N. or the OAS, of which state parties are members.21 These
international agreements range from “hard law” instruments, such as
treaties, to “soft law” instruments, like political pacts, codes of
conduct, and recommendations.22 The form of an instrument defines
its role in the regulation of SALW: “hard law” instruments create
obligations to which sovereign states are legally bound, while “soft
law” instruments declare standards that states should seek to attain.23
An additional distinction between these two legal forms is that “hard
law” instruments often contain compliance mechanisms to ensure
that states fulfill their obligations, whereas “soft law” treaties do not
because they are aspirational and non-binding.24 Such compliance
mechanisms can vary from programs monitoring implementation to
sanctions and trade embargoes.25
CIFTA, as well as the U.N. Protocol against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition (“U.N. Protocol”), are “hard law.”26 In
21. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 106 (addressing various forms of SALW
agreements stemming from international organizations, including the U.N. and
regional organizations in Latin America).
22. Cf. Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and Its Financing:
The Importance of Following a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule of
Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 583, 591 (2005) (noting that international regulations of
criminal activities (e.g. money laundering) tend to be a mixture of both “hard” and
“soft law”).
23. See, Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in
Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59,
62-64 (2003) (explaining that “hard law” represents a codification of norms that
states consent to be bound by whereas “soft law” does not impose duties upon
states).
24. See id. at 70-71 (reasoning that mechanisms in hard instruments incentivize
state compliance).
25. See generally Thilo Marauhn, Dispute Resolution, Compliance Control and
Enforcement of International Arms Control Law, in MAKING TREATIES WORK:
HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 243, 243-45 (Geir Ulfstein
ed., 2007) (discussing historical changes in compliance and enforcement
approaches to arms control treaties).
26. See Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition Supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255,
arts. 1, 2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 101st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255
(May 31, 2001) [hereinafter U.N. Protocol] (requiring parties to control small arms
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contrast, the U.N. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects (“Programme of Action”) is “soft law.”27 Thus, while the
Programme of Action successfully establishes norms for states to
abide by in their respective fights against SALW trafficking, states
ultimately decide for themselves whether to abide by its terms.28
1. Overview of CIFTA: Development, Requirements, and Successes
CIFTA was the first legally binding regional agreement to address
the problem of SALW trafficking.29 Proposals for the agreement
evolved from the OAS’ counter-narcotics efforts during the mid1990s when officials saw a linkage between drug and weapons
trafficking.30 The OAS’s Permanent Council and the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (“CICAD”) organized three
meetings of experts between 1993 and 1996 to discuss potential
firearms regulations.31 The meetings led to the creation of the Model
Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of
Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition (“CICAD
Model Regulations”).32 Following this development, a group of states
known as the Rio Group, prepared a draft treaty and presented it to

as a means to combat transnational organized crime).
27. See U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
in All Its Aspects, July 9-20, 2001, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,
pmbl., ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.192/15 (July 20, 2001) available at
http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/poahtml.aspx [hereinafter Programme of Action]
(marking states’ concurrence on measures needed to adequately combat illicit
SALW trafficking); see also JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 255 (underscoring the lack
of “compliance mechanisms for monitoring and enforce[ment]” in the Programme
of Action).
28. See Bobby L. Scott, Note, The U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade of
Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Exercise in Futility, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 681, 691-95 (2003) (discounting the Programme of Action for its “prima facie
unenforceability”).
29. DENISE GARCIA, SMALL ARMS AND SECURITY: NEW EMERGING
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 53 (2006).
30. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 102 (summarizing CIFTA’s development
within the OAS in addressing narcotics trafficking occurring in South America).
31. See id.
32. See id.; see also SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 4 (remarking that the CICAD
Model Regulations complement CIFTA and attempt to standardize procedures
used in OAS member states to manage the import, export, and transit of SALW).
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the Permanent Council of the OAS.33 Member states were then
permitted to comment on draft versions of CIFTA.34 CIFTA was
finalized and opened for signature on November 14, 1997.35
CIFTA seeks to avert illicit firearms manufacturing and trafficking
through controls on the SALW trade and encourages mutual
assistance between state parties.36 Under CIFTA, state parties are
required, among other things, to: 1) criminalize illicit manufacturing
and trafficking in SALW; 2) require the marking of firearms; 3)
confiscate or forfeit illegal SALW and establish procedures to ensure
their security; 4) establish and maintain licensing systems for the
export, import, and transit of SALW; 5) maintain records of weapons
transactions for a “reasonable” period of time; 6) cooperate and
exchange information, experience and training, and technical
assistance with other state parties; and 7) settle disputes through
diplomatic channels.37
CIFTA also called for the creation of a Consultative Committee to
promote collaboration and information exchange, as well as
recurring Conferences of State Parties to evaluate CIFTA’s
implementation status.38 Although the Consultative Committee’s

33. See Permanent Council of the Organization of American States [OAS],
Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, iii, OEA/Ser.G
CP/doc.2875/97 (Mar. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Draft Convention] (offering a draft
version of CIFTA to the Permanent Council for consideration). The Rio Group was
comprised of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 102.
34. OAS, Working Group to Consider an Inter-American Convention Against
the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives
and Other Related Materials, Interim Report of the Firearms Subgroup,
OEA/Ser.G/GT/CIFTA-2/97 (Mar. 31, 1997) [hereinafter Interim Report]. For the
purposes of this Comment, each negotiation session for CIFTA or states’ public
comments on the negotiations will be referred to as “CIFTA Working Group”
followed by the appropriate OAS document number and date.
35. See CIFTA, supra note 10.
36. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. II (CIFTA’s purpose is to “prevent, combat,
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms” by
“promot[ing] and facilitat[ing] cooperation and exchange of information and
experience among States Parties”).
37. See id. arts. IV, VI, IX, XI, XIII-XVI, XXIX.
38. See id. arts. XX, XXI, XXVIII (necessitating a Consultative Committee to
facilitate interactions between state parties, outlining the structure of committee
meetings, and calling for a meeting of state parties within five years after entry into
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decisions are not binding, they are influential.39 The Committee
works closely with CICAD to create model regulations for each of
CIFTA’s requirements.40
In the years following its inception, CIFTA was lauded as a model
legal framework for fighting SALW trafficking because it has a clear
and narrow purpose and encourages small scale, cooperative law
enforcement initiatives.41 CIFTA seeks only to curb the illicit trade in
firearms and related goods and does not limit lawful trade or
ownership of such items.42 Further, the required exchanges of
information under CIFTA are cost effective, and the training
programs are useful for states with weak governmental structures
that may be unable to adequately prepare law enforcement officials
to fight SALW trafficking.43
States party to CIFTA have realized a number of the treaty’s
goals.44 Notably, they have successfully convened two Conferences
of States Parties, each of which has elicited a pronouncement
recognizing CIFTA’s positive effect on OAS states and re-affirming
force and at regular intervals thereafter).
39. See id. art. XX(2) (clarifying that Consultative Committee decisions “shall
be recommendatory in nature”).
40. See, e.g., Conference of the States Party to the Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), Second Conference of the
States Party to the CIFTA, Mexico City, Mex., Feb. 20-21, 2008, Tlatelolco
Commitment, OEA/Ser.L/XXII.4 CIFTA/CEP-II/doc.7/08 rev.1 (Feb. 21, 2008)
[hereinafter Tlatelolco Commitment] (agreeing to “strengthen the coordination and
cooperation” between CIFTA’s Consultative Committee and CICAD, and noting
that, as of 2008, model regulations existed for Articles IV, VI, X).
41. See Koh, supra note 2, at 2354-55 (assessing CIFTA as “the best model” of
a legal framework with concrete goals); see also Zagaris, supra note 6, at 453
(examining how agreements like CIFTA remove constraints on the ability of law
enforcement officials to coordinate with their international counterparts).
42. See CIFTA, supra note 10, pmbl. (“[T]his Convention does not commit
States Parties to enact legislation or regulations pertaining to firearms ownership,
possession, or trade of a wholly domestic character . . . .”).
43. See Zagaris, supra note 6, at 453 (acknowledging that regional initiatives
encouraged by agreements like CIFTA require fewer resources and allow
developing states to glean expertise from states with superior law enforcement
capabilities).
44. See Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11 (identifying
Argentina, Brazil, and Nicaragua as parties in substantial compliance with CIFTA
and noting that the United States and Canada are also in substantial compliance
although they have yet to ratify CIFTA).
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states’ commitment to CIFTA’s implementation.45 The Second
Conference of States Parties also resulted in a report compiling data
on states’ compliance with CIFTA.46 Although the report showed
that many states are failing to comply with CIFTA’s provisions, it
singled out Argentina, Brazil, and Nicaragua as significantly
complying with CIFTA.47
With the help of CICAD, CIFTA’s Consultative Committee has
successfully prepared model legislation to assist states in
implementing CIFTA’s requirements as to weapons marking, export
controls, confiscation and forfeiture, and domestic criminalization of
illicit SALW manufacturing and trafficking.48 The Committee also
established a schedule to consider model legislation on record
keeping, information exchange, and security measures.49 Model
legislation is critical for CIFTA’s implementation because it provides
states with a legal text that can be easily incorporated into their
domestic legislation.50
Finally, states also utilize CIFTA’s framework to create or further
the objectives of other international instruments.51 Shortly after
45. See Conference of the States Party to the Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), First Conference of the States
Party, Bogota, Col., Mar. 8-9, 2004, Declaration of Bogota on the Functioning and
Application of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
(CIFTA), ¶¶ 6, 24, OEA/Ser.L/XXII.4 CIFTA/CEP-I/DEC.1/04 rev.3 (Mar. 9,
2004) [hereinafter Declaration of Bogota] (setting deadlines for states to establish
a national point of contact and dates for future meetings, and encouraging states to
implement CIFTA’s provision into domestic law); Tlatelolco Commitment, supra
note 40, pmbl., ¶¶ 2-3 (recognizing progress made since the First Conference of
States Party, but also reminding states of inadequate implementation levels).
46. See generally Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11.
47. Id. at 1 (noting further that Canada and the United States have not ratified
CIFTA but both meet its mandates).
48. See Tlatelolco Commitment, supra note 40, ¶ 4 (commending the creation
of model legislation on marking, export controls, and establishment of criminal
offenses); see also OAS, Comm. on Hemispheric Security, Draft Resolution, ¶¶ 3,
5, OEA/Ser.G CP/CSH-1098/09 (May 6, 2009) (mentioning draft model legislation
for confiscation and forfeiture).
49. See id. ¶ 3 (encouraging further model legislation for CIFTA’s provisions).
50. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 52 (explaining that model regulations
“transform[] a convention’s substantive provisions into a legal text that is
compatible with most states’ legal framework”).
51. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XXVII (allowing state parties to “engag[e]

CARLSON_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

622

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/3/2010 6:16 PM

[25:611

CIFTA opened for signature, five state parties developed a registry
and archive of firearms purchases through the Southern Common
Market (“MERCOSUR”) regional trade agreement.52 More recently,
representatives from CIFTA’s Consultative Committee have
participated in U.N. workshops on SALW issues and the U.N. has
praised CIFTA’s regional initiatives for their positive impact on state
compliance with the Programme of Action.53
2. Tackling SALW at the Global Level: The U.N. Protocol and
Programme of Action
There are two major SALW agreements that are global, rather than
regional, in scope: the legally binding U.N. Protocol and the
politically binding U.N. Programme of Action.54 Like CIFTA, both
instruments seek to reduce crime, governmental instability, and
human suffering by eliminating illicit SALW trafficking.55 Due to
differences in their development and nature, however, each seeks to
combat SALW through different means and practices.56

in cooperation within the framework of other . . . international, bilateral, or
multilateral agreements, or . . . arrangements or practices”).
52. See SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 26 (elaborating on the firearms registry—
created by MERCOSUR parties Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in
1998—that contains a database of “valid buyers and sellers of firearms, and
officially recognized points of entry and exit for firearms transfers”).
53. See Conference of the States Party to the Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), Consultative Committee Tenth
Regular Meeting, Apr. 24, 2009, Report of the Secretariat Pro Tempore of the
CIFTA Consultative Committee on Activities Carried Out During the Period 20082009, 2-3, OEA/Ser.L/XXII.2.10 CIFTA/CC-X/doc.9/09 (Apr. 23, 2009) (outlining
coordination between delegates of the United Nations and OAS during 2008-2009);
see also GARCIA, supra note 29, at 59 (noting that the U.N. has recognized Latin
American states for their leadership in implementing CIFTA and the Programme
of Action).
54. See GARCIA, supra note 29, at 57-58 (chronicling the creation of the two
global agreements).
55. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, pmbl. (highlighting the harmful effects of
SALW trafficking on security and social and economic development); Programme
of Action, supra note 27, pmbl. ¶¶ 2-3 (expressing concern that unlawful SALW
trading increases poverty, underdevelopment, and violence).
56. See generally ROGERS, supra note 1, at 102-25 (contrasting binding and
non-binding SALW agreements and explaining that the Programme of Action can
be more demanding and inclusive than the U.N. Protocol because states are not
obligated to comply).
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The U.N. Protocol was developed within the framework of the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
(“UNCATOC”) and has seventy-nine ratifying parties.57 Because it
was closely connected to its parent treaty, the U.N. Protocol opened
for signature in May 2001, but could not enter into force until after
the UNCATOC did in September 2003.58 Additionally, though the
U.N. Protocol was heavily influenced by CIFTA, adopting key
provisions verbatim, its primary purpose is to reduce organized
crime, not SALW trafficking.59 Application of the U.N. Protocol is
specifically limited to situations “where . . . offenses are
transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group.”60
In comparison, the Programme of Action is the largest and most
comprehensive SALW instrument.61 The U.N. conducted over a
decade’s worth of research to develop the Programme of Action and
150 states adopted the instrument during a U.N. Conference in
2001.62 As non-binding “soft law,” the Programme of Action
contains ambitious provisions through which states promise to work
at the national, regional, and international levels to curb illicit SALW
trading.63 The Programme of Action has been criticized for its lack of
enforcement mechanisms and the high financial cost of

57. See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
art. 1, opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13, 127, 2225 U.N.T.S.
209 (articulating global commitment to “combat” organized criminal activity); see
also Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, vol. II, ch. XVIII,
§ 12, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDS G/Volume%20II/Chapter%20
XVIII/XVIII-12.en.pdf (tracking ratification status of the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime) (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
58. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 103.
59. Id. at 104; see GARCIA, supra note 29, at 53 (commenting that CIFTA
inspired negotiations for the U.N. Protocol).
60. U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 4.
61. See U.N. General Assembly, Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider
the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York,
July 14-18, 2008, List of Participants, A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/INF/1/Add.1
(Aug. 12, 2008) (listing the many states in attendance).
62. See Scott, supra note 28, at 683-90 (describing the history of the U.N.
Programme of Action); ROGERS, supra note 1, at 117 (“Over 150 governments
reached consensus on the [Programme of Action].”).
63. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 117 (observing that the “broad-ranging”
coverage of the Programme of Action includes everything from “conflict
prevention” to “child soldiering”).
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implementation.64 Still, it remains the leading international regulation
on SALW.65

B. EXAMPLES OF CIFTA VIOLATIONS: PAST AND (POSSIBLY)
PRESENT
1. Confirmed Violation: Diversion of Nicaraguan AK-47s
In 2003, the OAS General Secretariat announced that Nicaragua
had violated certain CIFTA provisions.66 The Nicaraguan National
Police (“NNP”) had arranged a legitimate deal with Grupo de
Representaciones Internacionales (“GIR S.A.”), a Guatemalan
private arms dealership, to exchange AK-47s for pistols and miniUzis.67 GIR S.A. secured a buyer, Shimon Yelinek, for the arms.68
Unbeknownst to the NNP and GIR S.A., Yelinek was an illicit arms
merchant posing as a Panamanian National Police official and
presenting a forged purchase order.69 The NNP, GIR S.A., and
Nicaraguan customs all failed to verify Yelinek’s purchase order.70
The AK-47s were loaded onto a ship declared for Panama, but routed
to Colombia and sold to the insurgent organization United Self
Defense Forces of Colombia (“AUC”).71 According to OAS
investigators, full implementation of CIFTA in Nicaragua and
Panama “would have made the diversion far more difficult, if not
prevented it outright.”72
64. See Scott, supra note 28, at 690-91 (identifying “fundamental flaws” such
as the Programme of Action’s unenforceability).
65. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 230 (“The [Programme of Action] is the
central global agreement on preventing and reducing the trafficking and
proliferation of SALW.”).
66. See Press Release, OAS, OAS Presents Report on Investigation of
Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia,
Reference E-011/03 (Jan. 20, 2003) available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/
press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-011/03 (concluding that CIFTA noncompliance contributed to the diversion of AK-47s).
67. OAS, Report of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American
States on the Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to the United Defense Forces of
Colombia, § 1(I), OEA/Ser.G CP/doc. 3687/03 (Jan. 6, 2003) [hereinafter
Nicaraguan Diversion Report].
68. Id. (noting that the Nicaraguan Army introduced the GIR S.A. to the NNP).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 3(VI).
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2. Probable Violation: Diversion of Venezuelan Anti-tank Rocket
Launchers
In late July 2009, the Colombian military seized from the terrorist
group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”)Swedishmade anti-tank rocket launchers legally sold to Venezuela in the late
1980s.73 The weapons were confiscated during a raid of a FARC
camp in October 2008.74 Also discovered in the raid were email
messages by FARC commanders verifying plans to purchase surface
to air missiles and sniper rifles from Venezuelan military officials.75
FARC leaders denied obtaining the anti-tank machinery from
Venezuela and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez claimed the
weapons were stolen from a naval base in 1995.76 Regardless of how
and when FARC obtained these arms, this scenario suggests that
Venezuela breached its obligations under CIFTA by failing to ensure
the security of its SALW.77

73. Bazookas and Bases, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 32.
74. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog,
http://www.fas.org/blog/s sp/2009/08/securing-venezuela’s-arsenals.php (Aug. 24,
2009) (urging the international community to increase monitoring and fill gaps in
Venezuela’s arms control).
75. Simon Romero, Evidence Shows Venezuelan Aid to Rebel Group, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at A1. The U.S. Treasury Department has also accused the
military officials implicated in these emails of arming, abetting, and funding
FARC drug trafficking operations. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Supporting the FARC (Sep.
12, 2008) (targeting Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, former director of Venezuela’s
police intelligence agency, and Ramon Emilio Chacin, former Venezuelan Interior
Minister for Investigation).
76. See Bazookas and Bases, supra note 73, at 32 (claiming that Chavez
provided no proof to substantiate his claims that the weapons had been stolen);
FARC Chief Denies Getting Launchers from Venezuela, ABC NEWS, Aug. 13,
2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8319433 (reporting that
FARC commander Alfonso Cano repudiated allegations that he received weapons
from Venezuela).
77. See Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra note
74 (asserting that the Venezuelan government is responsible for any weapons
illegally diverted from its arsenals and reasoning that the international community
should focus attention on increasing security on Venezuelan SALW and scrutinize
the country’s SALW exports).

CARLSON_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

626

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/3/2010 6:16 PM

[25:611

II. ANALYSIS
International organizations like the OAS play a vital role in
implementing controls on SALW because they facilitate cooperation
between their member states and enable the negotiation of
international agreements. Where international organizations are
weak, however, is in their ability to guarantee state compliance with
SALW regulations.78 By entering into a treaty, the member states of
an international organization signal their willingness to uphold the
standards promulgated by the treaty. States’ compliance with the
terms of the treaty, however, is ultimately left to each individual state
party.79 While states may face some negative consequences for noncompliance, they are sovereign entities that have the ability to act in
their own self interests.80 The failure of CIFTA’s parties to abide by
its terms highlights OAS’ lack of police power and suggests that
some negative repercussions are needed to induce state compliance.

A. REVIEWING THE REASONS BEHIND CIFTA’S INEFFECTIVENESS
More than ten years have passed since CIFTA was opened for
signature and model regulations exist for five of its major provisions
to help states integrate CIFTA’s requirements into their domestic
law.81 Nonetheless, many of CIFTA’s ratifying states have failed to
fully implement its provisions.82 A number of factors contribute to
states’ continued non-compliance, including a dearth of financial
resources within the OAS, state parties’ lack of capacity to

78. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Diversion Report, supra note 67, § 3(VII) (stating
that the OAS has no police powers, and lamenting the inability of the OAS to
prosecute the criminals responsible for the diversion of Nicaraguan arms).
79. See generally Williamson, supra note 23, at 60 (asserting that the
conclusion of a treaty does not guarantee compliance and specifically evaluating
factors that induce states’ compliance with arms control treaties).
80. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 109-10 (stating that “governments do not
surrender the power to act in ways contravening their [treaty] obligations” and
observing that political and economic factors lead states to make calculated
decisions regarding compliance).
81. See, e.g., Tlatelolco Commitment, supra note 40.
82. See Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11, at 1 (reporting that
the majority of CIFTA’s state parties are only partially complying with the treaty’s
terms and that the national legislation of those states is “generally inadequate in
one or more areas—most notably with regard to marking, export and in-transit
licenses, and/or recordkeeping requirements”).
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adequately train law enforcement officers, and a paucity of political
will to propel implementation.83
The pervasiveness of corruption within Latin America also hinders
compliance.84 Corruption is deeply rooted within the region’s
political structure, but CIFTA does not address the impact of
corruption on SALW trafficking.85 There are also inadequacies in
CIFTA’s textual provisions and shortcomings in the OAS’ execution
of the treaty that contribute to non-compliance.86 While some of
these factors are beyond CIFTA’s scope, textual inadequacies in
CIFTA’s express terms and ineffective implementation methods can
be cured within CIFTA’s framework through minor modifications
and state cooperation.87
1. CIFTA’s Failure to Provide Effective Mechanisms to Monitor and
Enforce Compliance Hinders its Efficacy
a. Effective Treaties Require Effective Mechanisms
A major flaw in every international instrument regulating
trafficking in SALW is the lack of formal mechanisms to monitor
and enforce compliance.88 Compliance mechanisms generally

83. See SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 27 (identifying a need for more training
among CIFTA’s state parties); Williamson, supra note 23, at 72-74 (implying that
parties are less likely to abide by the terms of a treaty when there is little to no
political risk for non-compliance); Zagaris, supra note 6, at 470 (observing that the
OAS is still recovering from near bankruptcy in the 1980s and that the law
enforcement efforts are economically constrained).
84. See Luz Estella Nagle, The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized
Crime in Latin America, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1649, 1679-80 (2003) (advancing
that corrupt public and private officials in Latin America encourage organized
crime).
85. See id. at 1651, 59 (“Corruption, violence, and political, social, and
economic instability have plagued Latin American nations for generations.”).
86. See infra Part II(A)(1), (2) (critiquing CIFTA for its lack of an effective
compliance mechanism, for its inadequate definition of illicit trafficking, and for
its provisions on confiscated SALW and licensing).
87. Cf. JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 226-30 (noting that specific SALW regimes,
such as the Economic Community of West African States Convention, have been
modified to contain monitoring schemes and recognizing the extremely specific
terms of the Nairobi Protocol).
88. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (observing that CIFTA, the U.N.
Protocol, the Programme of Action, and regional SALW agreements in Africa,
Europe, and Asia each lack compliance mechanisms).
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provide a program whereby an international or non-governmental
organization oversees and verifies state implementation of a treaty.89
Though often costly to establish and maintain, compliance
mechanisms give treaties credibility because they create trust among
states parties and make it difficult for states to evade their
obligations.90 Similarly, compliance mechanisms may also provide a
remedy if a state breaches a treaty’s provisions.91
By submitting to the compliance mechanisms in a treaty, states
relinquish some of their sovereignty because they are delegating
power over their own responsibilities.92 To be effective, treaties must
therefore provide incentives for states to conform to compliance
mechanisms.93 Incentives may be negative, such as the imposition of
sanctions or embargoes for non-compliance, or positive, like clauses
calling for cooperation or mutual assistance.
Negative incentives seem appealing because they are forceful, but
they can have repressive results.94 For instance, imposing sanctions
or a trade embargo on a country for failing to comply with the terms
of a SALW trafficking treaty can lead to a drop in foreign direct
investment in that country and, therefore, fewer available resources
for individual citizens.95 There are also less harsh, yet effective
89. See generally MARAUHN, supra note 25, at 257-66 (evaluating various
means of compliance control in arms agreements, including verification and
inspection programs).
90. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 25 (conceding that the absence of compliance
mechanisms undermines the credibility of states’ commitments to their treaty
obligations); ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (explaining that compliance
mechanisms provide transparency and help assure treaty parties that other parties
are abiding by the treaty’s articles and provisions).
91. See MARAUHN, supra note 25, at 255-56, 66-70 (evaluating dispute
resolution clauses in arms control agreements, which parties utilize when potential
treaty breaches arise, as well as strategies used to end or rectify such violations).
92. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 47-48 (stressing that sovereign states
will incur the risk of delegating their powers to the party responsible for
overseeing a compliance mechanism if it enhances the credibility of their treaty
commitments).
93. See MARAUHN, supra note 25, at 250 (“Compliance with . . . arms control
agreements largely depends on the incentives States parties perceive with regard to
such agreements.”).
94. See id. at 251 (grappling with the often unjustly harsh effect of negative
incentives).
95. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 40 (articulating that sanctions can deter
investment as well as jeopardize a state’s ability to receive debt relief and aid).
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negative incentives, such as prominent publication of non-complying
states.96 In contrast, positive incentives induce state compliance by
making the benefits of abiding by a treaty outweigh the costs of
derogating from their obligations.97 Positive incentives should be
more comprehensive than the benefits inherent in arms control
agreements, such as enhanced national security.98 They must
convince states that it is in their best interest to expend even scarce
resources to comply with the treaty.99
Regardless of which incentives a treaty utilizes, the treaty should
ensure that states’ reputations are at risk if they do not meet their
obligations, including obeying compliance mechanisms.100 States are
most likely to comply when non-compliance will detrimentally
impact their reputation.101 For example, a state will probably
reconsider non-compliance with a treaty’s requirements if failure to
conform will make other states less willing to deal with that state or
if it will harm the state domestically by angering its electorate.102

96. Cf. id. at 39 (discussing the “naming and shaming” strategy used in the
Kimberly Process where the names of states that fail to submit reports on their
efforts to eliminate trade in conflict diamonds are published on the Process’s
website).
97. See generally Williamson, supra note 23, at 71-74 (insisting that states
utilize cost-benefit analyses to determine whether they will comply with their
treaty obligations and listing scenarios which induce states into compliance).
98. See MARAUHN, supra note 25, at 251 (contending that because states enter
into SALW agreements to improve their security, more than the mere guarantee of
security is needed to induce them into compliance).
99. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 25-26 (reasoning that states are unlikely to
abide by a treaty or a compliance mechanism if they do not receive clear-cut
political and reputational benefits).
100. See id. at 25-30 (recognizing that a treaty’s credibility is enhanced when
state parties are willing to incur reputational costs upon revocation or
contravention of their commitments).
101. See Williamson, supra note 23, at 71 (rationalizing that the higher the
“political risk of being labeled a lawbreaker,” the more likely states are to comply
with their treaty obligations).
102. E.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 26 (listing negative repercussions, both
international and domestic, that result from states’ failure to comply with their
formal obligations).
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b. The Impact of CIFTA’s Lack of Compliance Mechanisms
CIFTA does not provide compliance mechanisms.103 In fact, the
closest CIFTA comes to providing compliance mechanisms is the
requiring of a Consultative Committee and Conferences of States
Parties.104 The Consultative Committee gathers information,
facilitates exchanges between parties, and suggests ways in which
states can improve their compliance.105 Decisions and proposals by
the Consultative Committee are only recommendations and the
Committee, therefore, cannot compel or enforce state compliance.106
Additionally, compliance reports are presented at each Conference of
States Parties.107 These compliance reports make public any
deficiencies in states’ implementation of their treaty obligations.
Unfortunately, the reports are unreliable because the information is
self-reported and, thus, not transparent or verified by a body other
than the reporting state.108
Though CIFTA lacks formal compliance mechanisms, it has
positive incentives embedded within its requirements.109 CIFTA
mandates that parties confidentially exchange information, law
enforcement experience, and training techniques.110 Ostensibly, such
exchanges allow CIFTA states to benefit from their fellow states
parties’ knowledge and capabilities, but the extent of the benefits that
state parties receive from these provisions is unclear. CIFTA’s

103. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (denouncing CIFTA’s failure to require
government oversight of states’ compliance). But see Koh, supra note 2, at 2355
(commending CIFTA’s framework for creating domestic obligations to be
executed by state parties).
104. CIFTA, supra note 10, arts. XX, XXVIII.
105. Id. art. XX(1).
106. See id. art. XX(2).
107. See Declaration of Bogota, supra note 45, ¶ 23 (calling for the presentation
of reports on compliance at each Conference of States Parties).
108. See Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11, at 1 (acknowledging
the potential deficiency of information used in the Summary of Country
Compliance); JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 37-38 (criticizing self-reporting in
compliance monitoring because states can couch their non-compliance in rhetoric
and there is no “cross-check” to ensure validity).
109. See Koh, supra note 2, at 2355 (listing key provisions of CIFTA that drive
states’ implementation of its requirements, such as requiring a system of
import/export licensing of firearms).
110. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XII (guaranteeing the confidentiality of
exchanged information).
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requirements are vague, calling for exchanges only when they are
“appropriate.”111 The provisions also fail to identify how to conduct
and finance such exchanges, as well as what repercussions will result
from non-cooperation.112 Inopportunely, the U.N. Protocol is just as
ambiguous as CIFTA in this area.113 The U.N. Programme of Action,
on the other hand, encourages states to establish regional level
mechanisms for sharing information related to SALW trafficking.114
Unlike other arms control agreements that utilize outside entities
to help monitor compliance, CIFTA deals only with interactions
among state parties.115 Though CIFTA acknowledges existing
international law enforcement mechanisms, it does not require states
to utilize them.116 In contrast, the U.N. Programme of Action
encourages states and regional organizations to cooperate with nongovernmental organizations.117 The U.N. Protocol also requires states
to cooperate with commercial entities involved in the SALW trade.118
This is significant because it engages parties that have a strong
financial stake in SALW and an interest in minimizing illicit
trafficking to help further the agreements’ objectives.119
111. E.g., id. art. XV(2) (“States Parties shall cooperate . . . , as appropriate, to
ensure . . . adequate training of personnel in their territories . . . .”); see also
JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 257-59 (reproving the inclusion of clauses like “as
appropriate,” “where applicable,” and “where needed” within treaties because they
are indeterminate).
112. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that imprecision of treaty
provisions makes it hard for states to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable
behavior).
113. See generally U.N. Protocol, supra note 26 (providing minimal guidance
on conducting exchanges of information and technology).
114. See Programme of Action, supra note 27, art. II(27) (calling upon states to
establish “regional mechanisms,” including “networks for information-sharing
among law enforcement”).
115. See generally CIFTA, supra note 10.
116. See, e.g., id. pmbl. (“Recognizing the importance of . . . mechanisms such
as the International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System of [INTERPOL] . . .
.”).
117. See Programme of Action, supra note 27, art. II(40) (encouraging
international organizations and states to facilitate cooperation with nongovernmental organizations).
118. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 13(3) (mandating that states seek the
support of manufacturers, dealers, brokers and commercial carriers of SALW to
combat illicit trafficking).
119. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 248-49 (linking the willingness of
governments to work with the SALW industry to increased industry transparency
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CIFTA additionally contains a weak dispute resolution provision
for disagreements regarding its application or interpretation.120 While
the U.N. Protocol specifies the steps states must take when they
cannot agree, CIFTA merely calls for diplomatic settlement of
disputes and does not give any direction as to what remedies are
available.121The dispute resolution provisions in both treaties remain
ineffective, however, because neither compels states to resort to a
particular authority for settling disagreements.122
CIFTA cannot attain its full potential without the addition of a
mechanism that can monitor and verify compliance, and specific,
official ramifications for non-compliance.123 Fortunately, this goal is
within reach. Certain states voiced concerns during the negotiation
phase about CIFTA’s lack of compliance mechanisms, suggesting
their willingness to support the addition of such a mechanism into
the treaty.124 Further, as a “hard law” instrument, CIFTA is already
and a higher likelihood of industrial players helping to fight unlawful SALW
trading).
120. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XXIX (advising states to seek diplomatic
settlement of any disagreement on CIFTA’s application or interpretation).
121. Compare U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 16 (requiring states to seek
dispute settlement in phases: 1) through negotiation, then 2) via arbitration, and 3)
if the parties still cannot agree six months later, by referral to the International
Court of Justice) with CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XXIX (“Any dispute . . . shall be
resolved through diplomatic channels or . . . any other means of peaceful
settlement.”).
122. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (implying that CIFTA and the U.N.
Protocol would more effectively compel states’ compliance if they required states
to seek recourse from judicial authorities and imposed penalties for noncompliance).
123. See Zagaris, supra note 6, at 491 (concluding that everyday law
enforcement practices within the OAS rely on support from binding treaties with
“implementation and enforcement mechanisms that require accountability,
transparency, and provide the means to impose sanctions on non-complying
states”).
124. See, e.g., Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,
CIFTA Working Group, Observations of the Member States on the Draft
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials: El Salvador, OEA/Ser.G
GT/CIFTA-3/97 (May 8, 1997) (noting that El Salvador took issue with CIFTA’s
lack of mechanisms to facilitate cooperation and implementation); Permanent
Council of the OAS, CIFTA Working Group, Observations by Member States on
the Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, Other Related Materials: Belize, art. II,
OEA/Ser.G GT/CIFTA-3/97 (July 15, 1997) (expressing Belize’s discomfort with
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better positioned to enjoy efficacy because its ratifying parties
declared their willingness to legally bind themselves to its terms.125
2. Minor Textual Inadequacies with Major Consequences
The clarity of international instruments has a strong bearing on
state compliance. Textual precision in treaties helps states overcome
sovereignty barriers and narrows the scope of possible
interpretations.126 Specificity in treaty terms also clarifies states’
obligations and allows other parties to readily identify when a state is
not complying.127 Thus, the more precise the terms of a treaty, the
more likely states are to comply with them because non-compliance
risks damage to states’ political reputations.128 It is also essential that
the terms of arms control treaties plainly outline states’ obligations
because such treaties impact both state and human security.129
The form and structure of SALW trafficking instruments dictate
the specificity of their terms. “Hard law” instruments are sometimes
purposefully vague to avoid costly negotiations and to induce
compliance, while “soft law” instruments can be more precise
without deterring states from signing on to them because they are not
binding.130 Comparably, SALW agreements at the global level are
necessarily broad because they represent agreements between dozens
of states, whereas regional agreements like CIFTA can address arms

CIFTA’s lack of control mechanisms and recommending the implementation of
devices to ensure the regime’s efficacy).
125. See generally Williamson, supra note 23, at 71-74 (identifying contexts in
which “hard law” instruments are likely to have a compliance advantage over “soft
law” in SALW agreements).
126. See Zagaris, supra note 6, at 465 (conceding that multilateral agreements
force states to give up some sovereignty, but stating that states cooperate more
fluidly when “goals are distinct, technical, and clearly defined”).
127. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 41-42 (implying that clear-cut treaty
terms enhance an agreement’s credibility because states’ obligations are obvious
and their derogation from those obligations is readily apparent).
128. See id. (emphasizing that the “reputational stakes of non-compliance” are
increased when a state’s failure to comply can be easily discerned).
129. See Dekker, supra note 20, at 317-18 (stressing that clear language in arms
control treaties allows states to predict and act upon their legal rights and duties
under the treaty).
130. See generally JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 41-46 (addressing various theories
on the precision of treaty terms).
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trafficking in detail because each party understands the detrimental
impact illicit SALW have on the region.131
a. CIFTA’s Failure to Require Destruction of Confiscated Weapons
and Proper Management of Surplus Stockpiles Leaves Many
SALW Susceptible to Diversion
Though early drafts of CIFTA provided for the destruction of
confiscated and forfeited SALW,132 CIFTA is the only major SALW
treaty that does not require the destruction of weapons seized.133
CIFTA’s finalized provisions instead focus on ensuring that seized
and surrendered weapons are not re-introduced into the market.134
Similarly, CIFTA does not address surplus stockpile management.135
The potential consequences of excluding these seemingly basic
requirements from CIFTA’s text are grave.136 The military stockpiles
of SALW in most CIFTA state parties are already too large and
poorly secured.137 Military stockpiles in South American states, for
131. See GARCIA, supra note 29, at 58 (contending that small arms frameworks
at the global level represent the “low[est] common denominator” due to regional
differences); ROGERS, supra note 1, at 104-20 (scrutinizing the efficacy of both
global and regional international SALW trafficking instruments); Zagaris, supra
note 6, at 466 (stating that regional instruments are effective because the
international organizations that promulgate them help states address regionspecific problems).
132. See, e.g., CIFTA Working Group, OEA/Ser.G GT/CIFTA-7/97 Art. III(11)
(July 23, 1997) (obliging state parties to destroy or transfer to law enforcement for
official use all illicitly produced or trafficked weapons).
133. See, e.g., U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 6(2) (directing state parties to
seize and destroy confiscated and forfeited SALW as a means to prevent further
illicit trafficking); Programme of Action, supra note 27, art. II(16)-(19)
(encouraging states to establish measures for SALW destruction and effective
supervision of military inventories).
134. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. VII (requiring state parties “to ensure that
all [SALW] seized, confiscated, or forfeited . . . do not fall into the hands of
private individuals or businesses through auction, sale, or other disposal”).
135. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 108 (criticizing CIFTA for its inadequate
consideration of SALW inventory safety as compared with the SADC Firearms
Protocol and Nairobi Protocol, which oblige destruction of weapons surpluses).
136. See, e.g., CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 28-32 (declaring that most
SALW trafficked into Colombia from Ecuador and Peru originate from stolen
military stocks and that many are registered to the Venezuelan military).
137. See Aaron Karp, Surplus Arms in South America: A Survey 15 (Small Arms
Survey, Working Paper No. 7, 2009) available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org
/files/sas/publications/w_papers_pdf/WP/WP7-Surplus-Arms-in-SouthAmerica.pdf (evaluating South America’s substandard record of eliminating
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example, collectively have 1.3 million more modern SALW than
their militaries legitimately need.138 These stockpiles are notorious
sources of illicitly trafficked weapons, either through theft or
diversion by unscrupulous government employees.139 Adding
confiscated weapons to states’ SALW inventories only increases the
risk that they will be diverted, trafficked, and used for illegal
purposes.140
As its inclusion in both U.N. instruments demonstrates, the
appropriate disposal of excess SALW is a globally accepted, and
politically popular state practice.141 Destruction of excess SALW not
only reduces the chances that the weapons will be resold, but also
diminishes the likelihood that they will be stolen and used for
nefarious or violent purposes.142 Regrettably, only seven of CIFTA’s
states parties currently have programs in place to destroy seized and
surrendered SALW.143
States generally resist the idea of mandatory surplus destruction
and view such a requirement as falling wholly within their domestic
responsibilities.144 There is widespread recognition, though, that poor
surplus SALW and noting the vulnerability of the region’s military stockpiles).
138. See id. (explaining that there are about 3.6 million modern SALW in South
America even though the region’s militaries require only 2.3 million).
139. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 224 (discussing the risk of SALW losses
through various sources).
140. See generally Karp, supra note 137, at 16 (examining the vulnerability of
excessive supplies of SALW and the threat of unlawful and unintended SALW
losses in South American states).
141. See generally GARCIA, supra note 29, at 65-90 (reviewing the provisions
and policy implications of international instruments calling for destruction and
disposal of surplus SALW).
142. See id. at 67-68 (remarking that weapons destruction programs prevent
SALW from “falling into the hands of criminals” who contribute to increases in
crime).
143. See id. at 59 (indicating that SALW destruction has become a norm in
Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru).
144. See U.N. General Assembly, Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider
the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York,
July 14-18, 2008, Report of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, § IV(III)(17),
A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3 (Aug. 20, 2008), [hereinafter Third Biennial Meeting
Report] (“States stressed that decision-making on stockpile management . . . was a
national prerogative.”).

CARLSON_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

636

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/3/2010 6:16 PM

[25:611

stockpile management is a major security threat and that surpluses
only exacerbate that threat.145 Stockpiles in many CIFTA states
parties are susceptible to diversions through mismanagement, sale by
corrupt government officials, or via raids by criminals or rebel
groups.146 This susceptibility becomes even more apparent when
viewed in the context of Venezuela’s potential breach of CIFTA.
Here, proper stockpile management would have prevented the loss of
the anti-tank weapons and Colombia could (and should) destroy
them to guarantee they are never used for harm.147
The global consensus on the importance of destroying confiscated
and forfeited weapons, combined with the weak stockpile
management provisions in CIFTA, demonstrates the need to amend
CIFTA to require destruction of surplus SALW and effective arsenal
management. Similarly, the prior desire of CIFTA’s states parties to
include destruction requirements in the treaty and the
commencement of some destruction programs within the region
shows that such requirements would likely be accepted. Thus,
including destruction and stockpile management requirements into
CIFTA’s Articles VII and VIII, respectively, could exert pressure on
state parties sufficient to induce them into compliance since failure to
fulfill such obligations would be politically detrimental.148

145. See id. § IV(III)(17)-(22) (recounting state parties’ views on inadequately
monitored stockpiles and continued accumulation of weapons as security threats).
146. See, e.g., CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 29-30 (noting that
Colombian rebel groups are known to raid other states’ weapons reserves);
SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 22 (elaborating on trafficking methods that weapons
smugglers in Ecuador and Venezuela use).
147. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra
note 74 (deriding the Venezuelan government for failing to safeguard its military
arsenals and calling on states to closely monitor their SALW).
148. See Dekker, supra note 20, at 325 (averring that the possibility of damage
to states’ political reputation can cause them to alter their behavior); GARCIA,
supra note 29, at 68 (“Key practitioners in the small-arms debate have pointed to
stockpile management and destruction of excess arms as the simplest and most
reliable way to prevent proliferation of illicit arms.”). But see Scott, supra note 28,
at 698-701 (attacking the virtue of arms trafficking regimes and arguing that
reducing the supply of SALW merely makes illicit trafficking more lucrative for
smugglers).
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b. CIFTA Fails to Clearly Identify What Information Licenses for
SALW Transfers Must Contain and to Mandate End-User
Requirements
Licenses for and other regulations on SALW transfers, including
imports, exports, and in-transit shipments, are necessary to control
the legal weapons trade and to combat unlawful SALW trafficking.149
Because licenses and authorizations are essential to SALW trade, it
is imperative that their regulating instruments clearly identify what
information licenses should contain and which kind of licenses states
ought to demand.150
Precision and transparency in the SALW licensing process is
especially important for CIFTA’s member states.151 Fraudulent
transfer licenses and certifications largely contribute to illegal SALW
diversions within the region.152 Moreover, CIFTA members are
predominantly importing states and tend to utilize import controls
more than export controls because SALW pose a higher risk of harm
to importing states.153 Export controls with end-use requirements,
149. See generally OWEN GREENE & ELIZABETH KIRHAM, SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS TRANSFER CONTROLS TO PREVENT DIVERSION: DEVELOPING AND
IMPLEMENTING KEY PROGRAMME OF ACTION COMMITMENTS (2007) (outlining the
purpose and mechanics of trade regulations on SALW and specifically analyzing
regulations under the Programme of Action). See also YANN AUBIN & ARNAUD
IDIART, EXPORT CONTROL LAW AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO MILITARY AND DUAL-USE GOODS TRADE RESTRICTIONS AND
COMPLIANCE (2007) (discussing laws regulating the lawful weapons trade).
150. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra
note 74 (expounding upon the relationship between rigorous trade authorizations
and the fight against illicit trafficking with particular emphasis on Venezuela).
151. See, e.g., Clinton Urges Transparency in Venezuelan Arms Purchases,
VOANEWS, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-0915-voa60-68709812.html (voicing concern about the connection between the lack
of transparency in Venezuela’s arms acquisitions and diversions of SALW to
illegal groups).
152. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Diversion Report, supra note 67, §§ 1(I), 3(IV)
(calling attention to the use of fraudulent trade documentation by SALW
traffickers and advising CIFTA’s state parties to abide by its licensing provisions
and consider applying the CICAD Firearms Regulations).
153. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 242-43 (deducing that states relying
predominantly on imported SALW benefit from controls on SALW transfers);
ROGERS, supra note 1, at 151 (reporting states’ general preference for small arms
import controls over export controls). This is particularly true when importing
states are also suffering from on-going internal conflict. See JOJARTH, supra note
1, at 243 (referring to Colombia’s ardent support of tight SALW controls as a
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however, generally force the exporting state to identify the purchaser
of each SALW and prohibit the purchaser from transferring weapons
to any other party.154 Therefore, insisting upon export controls with
end-use requirements would certify that SALW go only to the
legitimate buyer to which they are exported.155
Article IX of CIFTA mandates only that states establish licensing
procedures and that they confirm that any states involved in a
transfer of SALW have issued authorizing documentation before
allowing the transfer to proceed.156 Though the CICAD Firearms
Regulations provide CIFTA states with some guidance, as they
outline in detail what the OAS’s member states ought to demand in
terms of transfer licensing, CIFTA itself provides states with no
direction.157 Comparing CIFTA to the U.N.’s SALW instruments
also makes clear that CIFTA’s licensing provisions are much less
rigorous than they should be. In addition to the state party
authorizations demanded by CIFTA, the U.N. Protocol outlines the
minimum information required in export and import licenses and any
related documentation.158 The Programme of Action goes even
further, encouraging states to implement laws requiring the
utilization of end-use certificates.159
Providing minimum information requirements and mandating
verification of licenses would reduce the risk of CIFTA violations.160
means to frustrate rebel groups’ access to SALW).
154. See GREENE & KIRKHAM, supra note 149, at 14-17 (noting cases of
inadequate end-user controls and the acceptance of illicit end-use certification).
155. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra
note 74 (stressing the need for end-user requirements in weapons sales throughout
South America).
156. CIFTA, supra note 10, art. IX.
157. See SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 4 (observing that the CICAD Firearms
Regulations “seek to harmonize procedures and documentation used by OAS
member states to control” the SALW trade).
158. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 10(3) (requiring export and import
licenses, authorizations, and accompanying documentation to contain the place and
date of issuance, date of expiration, exporting and importing country, final
recipient, a description of the SALW, and the names of countries through which
the SALW will be shipped).
159. See Programme of Action, supra note 27, art. II(12) (undertaking “[t]o put
in place and implement adequate . . . procedures to ensure effective control over
the export and transit of [SALW], including the use of authenticated end-user
certificates”).
160. Cf. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 150-51 (observing domestic regulatory
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Had such provisions been in place prior to the diversion of
Nicaraguan arms, customs officials would have been better
positioned to review Yelinek’s fraudulent certifications and thwart
the diversion.161 In fact, Colombia criticized CIFTA’s meager
licensing provisions during the negotiation phase, arguing that
CIFTA should state exactly what information import and export
licenses should contain.162 In addition, states and scholars alike stress
the need for importing and exporting states to demand end-user
requirements on SALW shipments.163 End-user requirements are
particularly vital for CIFTA’s states parties at present, given their
continued acquisition of large numbers of SALW from major
exporting states like Russia and France.164
Some scholars have argued that states are less inclined to comply
with tight controls on the SALW trade.165 But these contentions fail
to consider the economic aspects of SALW exports. States with a
stake in the SALW market do not want to chill trade and are
therefore more likely comply with increased licensing
requirements.166 Consequently, the addition of specific licensing and
regimes that many states have implemented that align with their international
treaty obligations to control SALW).
161. See Nicaraguan Diversion Report, supra note 67, at 14 (arguing that
Nicaragua failed to abide by CIFTA Article IX and asserting that Nicaraguan law
should clearly establish what customs officials must look for on SALW licenses).
162. See, e.g., OAS, CIFTA Working Group, Observations by Member States on
the Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, Other Related Materials: Colombia, 7,
OEA/Ser.G GT/CIFTA-3/97 add. 6-a (July 11, 1997) [hereinafter Observations by
Member States: Colombia] (setting forth Colombia’s proposed wording for CIFTA
art. V, requiring, at a minimum, proof of a national certificate; country, date, and
identification of the end-user; authorizing agency/importing state; and total
quantity of weapons shipped).
163. See, e.g., Third Biennial Meeting Report, supra note 144, § IV(II)(12)
(“States noted the importance of end-user certification, including verification
measures, in addressing the problem of illicit brokering.”); Posting of Matt
Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra note 74 (insisting that states
exporting SALW to Venezuela implement end-use requirements).
164. See, e.g., Robert Munks, Could War Erupt in Arms-Spree LatAm?, BBC
NEWS, Sept. 15, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8256686.stm (drawing
attention to recent large-scale military purchases in South America).
165. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 237-38 (suggesting states shirk licensing
responsibilities when it is in their own political interest to do so).
166. See generally id. at 234-48 (reviewing the costs and benefits to states from
compliance with SALW instruments, including licensing provisions).
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end-user requirements to CIFTA’s text would be a feasible and
realistic step towards enhancing the security of CIFTA’s states
parties.
c. CIFTA’s Failure to Include Unmarked or Inadequately Marked
SALW in its Definition of “Illicit Trafficking” Prevents Effective
Detection and Prevention of Unlawful SALW Trafficking
CIFTA defines “illicit trafficking” as any trade or transfer of
SALW not authorized by the importing, exporting, and in-transit
states.167 This definition is broad and encompasses both legal and
black or gray market transfers of weapons.168 It does not, however,
make any reference to states’ obligations under Article VI of CIFTA
to mark weapons so that they can be easily identified.169 In
comparison, Article 3 of the U.N. Protocol has nearly the same
definition of “illicit trafficking,” but considers unmarked or
inadequately marked weapons to be illicit.170 The parties to the U.N.
Protocol recognized that incorporating marking provisions into the
definition of “illicit trafficking” helped to regulate transfers of
unmarked firearms.171 Providing a similar recognition within

167. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. I(2) (“‘Illicit trafficking’: the import, export,
acquisition, sale, delivery, movement, or transfer of firearms, ammunition,
explosives, and other related materials from or across the territory of one State
Party to that of another State Party, if any one of the States Parties concerned does
not authorize it.”).
168. See CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 58-60 (indicating that illicitly
trafficked weapons can originate from both the licit and illicit markets).
169. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. VI (requiring firearms marking at the time
of manufacture and import, and on confiscated or forfeited weapons retained for
official use).
170. U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 3(e) (including “firearms . . . not marked
in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol” within the definition of illicit
trafficking). The Programme of Action does not specifically define illicit
trafficking. See generally Programme of Action, supra note 27 (lacking a section
defining key terms of the agreement). See also U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS & CRIME,
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ELABORATIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 605 (United
Nations 2006) [hereinafter TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES] (showing that firearms
marking was not included in the U.N. Protocol’s definition of illicit trafficking as
of the first negotiating session in January of 1999).
171. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 3(e) (acknowledging that state
representatives at the U.N. Protocol negotiations willingly included marking as
part of the definition of “illicit trafficking”).
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CIFTA’s text is necessary to induce the treaty’s parties into
compliance with their marking obligations under Article VI.172
Firearms marking is generally accepted as a necessary component
of pursuing illicit weapons traffickers, controlling unwanted
diversions of weapons, and conducting effective investigations and
prosecutions.173 For instance, serial numbers on the anti-tank
weapons seized from FARC in Colombia were used to trace the
weapons back to a Swedish company.174 State non-compliance with
marking requirements, which alone is a breach of CIFTA’s
provisions, severely hinders the law enforcement process.175 In
addition, the significance of marking is even more apparent given the
problem of unsecured surplus SALW stockpiles throughout Latin
America.176
As of February 2008, only seven of the thirty parties to CIFTA
had domestic legislation requiring firearms marking.177 Including the
failure to adequately mark weapons within CIFTA’s definition of
“illicit trafficking” would provide an impetus for states to enforce its
marking provisions. Further, broadening Article I’s definition of
“illicit trafficking” would allow states to criminalize trading of
unmarked or inadequately marked weapons under Article IV.178

172. See Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11, at 1 (censuring states
for the overall levels of non-compliance with CIFTA’s marking requirements).
173. See GARCIA, supra note 29, at 57 (describing the marking system required
by the U.N. Protocol and the essential role of marking in law enforcement efforts
to recover diverted SALW).
174. E.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra note
74 (describing the discovery of arms within a FARC camp).
175. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. VI (obliging state parties to require
markings at the time of manufacture and import, and upon confiscated or forfeited
weapons); GARCIA, supra note 29, at 57 (stressing “[t]he importance of firearmmarking to the law enforcement community”).
176. See Karp, supra note 137, at 4 (noting that unguarded surplus military
small arms increase the risk that diverted weapons will be used in civil violence
and underscoring the need for effective checks on unlawful diversions).
177. See generally Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11 (outlining
each OAS member’s compliance with each of CIFTA’s technical requirements).
178. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. IV (requiring states to criminalize illicit
trafficking).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Trafficking of illegally diverted weapons threatens both human
and state security throughout Latin America.179 Despite the dire
consequences this situation presents, CIFTA’s reputable and crucial
goals “to prevent, combat, and eradicate” illicit weapons trafficking
have yet to be attained.180 CIFTA’s states parties are non-compliant,
its framework remains inadequate, and efforts to execute the treaty
have been weak and insubstantial.181 CIFTA’s Consultative
Committee and the OAS should respond to this situation by
designing mechanisms to guarantee implementation of CIFTA’s
provisions in each of the ratifying state parties and by advocating
textual amendments to CIFTA.
A. MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING AND ENFORCING COMPLIANCE
SHOULD BE CREATED TO FACILITATE STATES’ IMPLEMENTATION
OF CIFTA
CIFTA’s goals will not be attained without incentivizing
compliance and facilitating dispute resolution. At present, there is no
official oversight of states parties’ implementation of CIFTA.182 The
ideal compliance mechanism for CIFTAwould be objective,
institutionalized supervision of compliance by a well-recognized
non-governmental organization.183 Unfortunately, such a solution is
unlikely within the OAS because it is expensive and the OAS utilizes
non-governmental organizations only for their expert opinions and
advice regarding the functioning of its own organs.184 Still, the OAS

179. See, e.g., CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 53-54 (commenting that
illicit trafficking has “contributed to an escalation of violence in Colombia” and
surrounding states).
180. CIFTA, supra note 10, art. II. See generally Koh, supra note 2 (expounding
upon the integral role of SALW regimes in stemming the violence that illegal
weapons cause).
181. See generally Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11 (reporting
the implementation deficiencies in each of CIFTA’s state parties).
182. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (stressing CIFTA’s lack of a formal
mechanism to guarantee states’ compliance).
183. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 245 (claiming active monitoring by nongovernmental organizations reduces the risk of states avoiding their obligations).
See generally Marauhn, supra note 25, at 262-66 (describing various means of
compliance verification, including institutionalization of compliance procedures).
184. See OAS, Permanent Council, Guidelines for the Participation of Civil
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should strive to avoid directly addressing state responsibility, as this
is a disfavored approach in multilateral agreements like CIFTA.185
A more viable option is building a verification and monitoring
regime into the treaty. The responsibilities of the Consultative
Committee should be expanded beyond simple information gathering
and its suggestions should be more than merely “recommendary.”186
At a minimum, the Committee should be able to require states to
exchange information when necessary and monitor such exchanges
rather than waiting for states to cooperate between themselves.187
Going further, procedures for routine verification inspections should
be established.188 States may resist such inspections, viewing them as
sovereignty infringements, so the inspections should be conducted by
an OAS consultant, rather than a state-representative on the
Consultative Committee. Regardless of the specific inspection
process chosen by the OAS, states should be made aware of the
nature, duration, and schedule of inspections.189
In conjunction with this recommendation, the OAS should also
solicit, if not require, the assistance of businesses and nongovernmental organizations. The addition of a provision like Article
13 of the U.N. Protocol, which requires states to cooperate with

Society Organizations in OAS Activities, ¶ 3, OEA/Ser.G CP/RES. 759 (1217/99)
(Dec. 15, 1999) (defining the scope of participation of civil society groups,
including non-governmental organizations, as providing expert advice and
participating in the design, finance, and execution of OAS projects). See generally
ROGERS, supra note 1, at 191-97 (identifying financial cost as a drawback to
institutionalized compliance monitoring).
185. See Marauhn, supra note 25, at 270 (noting that terms such as “legality”
and “illegality” are rarely used in compliance provisions because they come too
close to addressing state responsibility, which is generally avoided in treaties).
186. See Marauhn, supra note 25, at 256 (providing an example of a standing
consultative committee with the ability to field parties’ questions about other
states’ compliance and provide advice on how to handle ambiguous situations).
187. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 38 (discussing compliance regimes in
which international institutions authenticate state-to-state transactions by crosschecking parties’ submitted reports against one another).
188. See Marauhn, supra note 25, at 258 (identifying transparent verification as
an essential means to build trust between states and pressure them into
compliance).
189. See Dekker, supra note 20, at 320 (specifying important components of
verification processes and explaining that verification is not continual or
permanent but rather it is a responsive mechanism).
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industrial players, is worthy of consideration.190 Such a provision
could assist with the financial burden of implementing a compliance
regime because entities with a financial stake in the SALW trade
may be a valuable source of funding. Moreover, a non-governmental
organization can be engaged to publicly identify non-compliant
states on a website or in a publication in an effort to pressure those
states into compliance.191
Dispute resolution procedures should also be considered when
formulating a compliance mechanism. Presently, CIFTA provides
only that state parties are to resolve disputes diplomatically.192 State
initiated investigations by the General Secretariat exist as a means
for states to obtain an objective assessment of problematic
situations.193 Making such investigations mandatory upon suspicion
of treaty violations or providing another specific procedure for states
to follow could encourage them to seek official remedies for
potential breaches of CIFTA.

B. CIFTA SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR DESTRUCTION
OF CONFISCATED AND FORFEITED WEAPONS, PROPER STOCKPILE
MANAGEMENT, DETAILED LICENSING, AND MANDATORY ENDUSE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL SALW, AND AN EXPANDED
DEFINITION OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING
CIFTA’s framework is based upon the general international
consensus against SALW trafficking and it loosely outlines states’
domestic obligations.194 As a regional agreement, however, CIFTA
should be at least as specific as a global agreement to be effective.

190. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 13(3) (“State Parties shall seek the
support and cooperation of manufacturers, [traders], and commercial carriers of
[SALW] . . . .”).
191. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 39 (recognizing publication of
compliance status as a way to involve civil society in the compliance monitoring
process). But see Dekker, supra note 20, at 325 (warning that states may become
less cooperative with a compliance regime when under pressure).
192. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XXIX (calling for resolution of disputes
through “diplomatic channels”).
193. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Diversion Report, supra note 67, § 2(I) (noting that
Colombia, Nicaragua, and Panama requested an investigation by the OAS General
Secretariat into a large scale illicit diversion of AK-47s).
194. See Koh, supra note 2, at 2354-55 (extolling CIFTA’s legal framework and
the domestic legislative actions it requires).
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Thus, CIFTA and its states parties would benefit from the inclusion
of certain textual amendments, particularly if instituted together with
an effective compliance mechanism which would verify that new
requirements are being met.
1. Required Destruction of Confiscated and Forfeited Weapons and
Effective Stockpile Management Will Reduce the Risk of Illicit SALW
Trafficking in CIFTA States
CIFTA’s Article VII should be altered to require states parties to
destroy confiscated or forfeited weapons. States parties are likely to
be amenable to such a requirement; parties to the U.N. Protocol were
willing to obligate themselves to the practice of destruction and
seven CIFTA states already do so.195 Further, this amendment should
also require states to devise a destruction procedure that is
transparent, considers the military’s actual SALW needs, and
contains sufficient oversight to control potential losses through
corrupt employees.196
Next, CIFTA’s Article VIII should call for appropriate stockpile
management. The Article’s vague references to security measures are
insufficient to combat the threat of diversion from unsecured
stockpiles.197 The text should be modified to require well-managed
and well-administered oversight of SALW reserves.198 Because
requiring destruction of surplus weapons is stringent and states may
resist such an imposition, CIFTA states should alternatively consider
adjusting the text to suggest that surplus destruction is preferable, but
not required.199 Finally, CIFTA should develop procedures that can

195. See supra Part II(A)(2)(a) (acknowledging that destruction is required
under Article 6(2) of the U.N. Protocol and that Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru already practice destruction).
196. See Karp, supra note 137, at 4 (calling for public scrutiny of SALW
destructions and assurances that states are not inflating their projected needs for
military weapons).
197. See supra Part II(A)(2)(a) (criticizing CIFTA’s failure to specify security
measures for protecting SALW stocks).
198. See generally Karp, supra note 137 (assessing problems associated with
inadequately secured military stockpiles and providing detailed recommendations).
199. See Third Biennial Meeting Report, supra note 144, at 12 (showing state
parties to the Programme of Action preferred national handling of surplus
destruction).
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negate the chances of diversion of SALW from stockpiles by
disreputable government workers.
2. The Addition of Licensing and End-User Requirements into
CIFTA’s Text Will Assist Law Enforcement in Combating Trafficking
and Clarify States’ Responsibilities
Article IX of CIFTA should be modified to identify the minimum
amount of information that must appear on SALW licenses. CIFTA’s
states parties signaled a desire for guidance on licensing procedures
during negotiations and would therefore likely be open to the
modification.200 Probable solutions include either making Article IX
mirror the U.N. Protocol’s Article 10(3) or incorporating the CICAD
Model Regulations into CIFTA’s text.201
Additionally, Article IX should require exporting states to include
end-user requirements on their exports, and more importantly, to
require importing states to demand end-user requirements from any
states exporting arms into their territory.202 End-user requirements
are widely acknowledged as an effective means of fighting unlawful
diversions because they force exporters and exporting states to
shoulder some of the burden.203 The OAS may also consider
requiring rigorous end-use monitoring, which would entail follow-up
inspections on arms exports into states’ territories.204

200. See Observations by Member States: Colombia, supra note 162, at 7-8
(emphasizing the usefulness of detailed licensing provisions).
201. See supra Part II(A)(2)(b) (analyzing weaknesses in CIFTA’s licensing
provisions by comparison to the U.N. Protocol and considering perspectives voiced
at CIFTA’s negotiation).
202. See Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra note
74 (advocating for stringent end-user requirements to combat SALW in OAS
member states).
203. See generally GREENE & KIRKHAM, supra note 149 (explaining the
breakdown of parties’ responsibilities within transfer controls on SALW).
204. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra
note 74 (articulating a need for end-user requirements across South America and
suggesting methods of implementation).
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3. Including Marking Requirements in CIFTA’s Definition of “Illicit
Trafficking” Will Expand CIFTA’s Reach and Promote Law
Enforcement Efforts to Track Illegal SALW
CIFTA’s Article I(2) should be amended to include transfers of
unmarked or inadequately marked weapons within the definition of
“illicit trafficking” because it will broaden CIFTA’s scope and
promote effective law enforcement by ensuring the tracing of
illegally diverted weapons.205 This addition would also encourage
states to adopt the Consultative Committee’s model legislation on
marking since they would be held responsible for the failure to mark.
Along with the amendment to Article I(2), Article IV should be
modified to require the criminalization of falsifying or obliterating
markings on weapons. While it cannot be added until marking is
included in “illicit trafficking,” this modification is necessary given
Latin American states’ growing arsenals and may further dissuade
gray market transfers by corrupt government officials.206

CONCLUSION
Illicit SALW trafficking is rampant in Latin America; there are 98
known trafficking routes into Colombia alone.207 Across the region,
weapons ranging from AK-47s to anti-tank missiles are extremely
easy to acquire and even easier to use. The business of arms
trafficking is lucrative for the criminals involved, but it represents a
grave threat to Latin American society because illegal SALW trading
brings with it increased levels of violence and strained inter-state
relations.
In passing CIFTA, OAS member states, comprised primarily of
Latin American nations, were at the forefront of the movement to
combat SALW trafficking. CIFTA even served as a model for the

205. See GARCIA, supra note 29, at 57 (describing marking as an integral tool in
the investigation of illegally trafficked weapons).
206. See Scott, supra note 28, at 699 (observing that corruption and profitmaking motives of government officials are often responsible for illegal transfers
of weapons because lax controls allow them to evade detection).
207. See CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 18 (listing SALW trafficking
routes into Colombia, including “21 . . . from Venezuela, 26 from Ecuador, 37
from Panama, and 14 from Brazil”).

CARLSON_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

648

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/3/2010 6:16 PM

[25:611

U.N. Protocol. Unfortunately, state non-compliance and ineffective
approaches to implementation have limited CIFTA’s ability to
combat the SALW threat. These errors are not irreversible. CIFTA’s
efficacy can be enhanced and its purpose realized through minor
textual amendments to the treaty and the creation of a compliance
scheme that accounts for corruption.

